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Abstract: Modern armed conflicts have a tendency to cluster together and spread 
geographically. However, the geography of most conflicts remains under-studied. To fill this 
gap, this article presents a new indicator that measures two key geographical properties of 
subnational political violence: the conflict intensity within a region on the one hand, and the 
spatial distribution of conflict within a region on the other. We demonstrate the indicator in 
North and West Africa between 1997 to 2019 to show that it can clarify how conflicts can spread 
from place to place and how the geography of conflict changes over time.  
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Introduction 
The pivot toward the study of civil war, terrorism, and insurgency since the end of the 
Cold War has reinvigorated interest in the geography of armed conflicts in the wider conflict 
studies literature. While the influences of geography on armed conflict is always highly 
contextual, the literature has coalesced around two key findings regarding the geographic nature 
of conflict. First, when conflict events are mapped with some precision over time, they have a 
strong tendency to cluster together in both geographic space and time (Buhaug and Gledistch 
2008). Second, and connected to the first, conflicts also tend to spread over space and time 
(Schutte and Weidmann 2011) with the potential to not remain neatly confined with the 
territorial geography of states (Gleditsch 2007, Salehyan 2009, Arsenault and Bacon 2015). 
Taken together, these observations reflect dual truisms about the spatial nature of armed conflict: 
it is both a geographically uneven and temporally dynamic phenomena. 
These findings are the result of several intersecting trends, including the increasing 
application of sophisticated data visualization and analysis tools of geographic information 
systems (GIS) and the development of numerous datasets that track the location and timing of 
political violence (Gleditsch 2020). For example, the well-known ACLED data project now 
boasts access to a collection of hundreds of thousands of records about discrete acts of violence 
spanning numerous states across multiple continents and regions (ACLED 2020). And yet, 
despite the proliferation of both GIS-based tools and GIS-ready data, there has been relatively 
little in the way of research about the dynamic geography of political violence that aims for more 
than a descriptive mapping of the presence or absence of violence (Walther et al. 2019).  
Of course, such descriptive analyses remain useful in providing basic information about 
areas and populations affected by conflict or in suggesting issues that may serve as motivating 
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grievances for the belligerents. Nonetheless, taking the investigation of the geography of armed 
conflict seriously would necessarily move toward a more comprehensive questioning of the 
space-time dynamics involved and the associated understanding of the spatial and temporal 
properties at play. 
The aim of this article is to address this gap by introducing a new spatial indicator 
designed for use with political event data. The indicator incorporates two fundamental spatial 
dimensions of political violence that can vary over time within any given region; we call these 
conflict intensity and conflict concentration. Conflict intensity, or the amount of violence within 
a region, can increase or decrease over time according to the military capabilities and political 
strategies of the actors in a conflict. Conflict concentration, or how violent events are distributed 
spatially across a region, considers whether events are diffused across a region or, conversely, 
concentrated on a limited space. 
The new Spatial Conflict Dynamics indicator (SCDi) was developed with these ideas in 
mind. The SCDi can leverage political event data from most space-time event datasets, such as 
ACLED, and can be used for comparisons across multi-state regions or within a single state 
context. The SCDi is also adaptable to any size or configuration of underlying areas used for 
analysis and can utilize any temporal duration desired. In this paper, we illustrate the SCDi with 
an application to the case of North and West Africa, analyzing over 30,000 discrete events 
through a 22-year time span and across a 21-state geographical area. We use the SCDi to not just 
show which regions or places experience the most conflicts but to also demonstrate how the 
inherent spatiality of conflict can change over time. 
The article proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss recent efforts to develop 
new spatially disaggregated event datasets that capture the temporal and spatial dynamics of 
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wars and conflicts and highlight the contribution of the SCDi to this burgeoning literature. We 
then describe the indicator in detail. Using ACLED data, we next show the indicator’s potential 
in describing the long-term spatial evolution of conflicts in North and West Africa. Our 
conclusion highlights the key contributions and limitations of our new indicator and avenues for 
future research. 
 
Motivation for a new indicator 
The past decade has yielded a greater emphasis on developing geographically referenced 
political conflict event data (e.g., Schrodt and Yonamine 2013). While past analyses on armed 
conflict were characterized by state-centric approaches and a general lack of reliable data at the 
substate level, contemporary studies often build on so-called ‘spatially-disaggregated’ 
subnational event data to investigate the onset, duration, and impacts of armed conflicts (Raleigh 
and Hegre 2009, Buhaug et al. 2009, Tollefsen et al. 2012). In this literature, spatially-
disaggregated refers to information about an event that has as much geographic (and temporal) 
specificity as possible about precisely where (and when) an event has occurred.  
Numerous datasets now track subnational expressions of political violence, including the 
Global Terrorism Database (Lafree and Dugan 2007), the aforementioned ACLED, and the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Sundberg and Melander 2013). Other more specialized 
geocoded datasets include the Militarized Interstate Dispute Location or MIDLOC dataset 
(Braithewaite 2010), the Ethnic Power Relations data (Wucherpfennig et al. 2011), the Geo-PKO 
dataset on peacekeeping operations (Cil et al. 2019), and the Leadership Changes in Rebel 
Groups dataset (Lutmar and Terris 2019). What these examples all have in common is a reliance 
on identifying the location of an event as precisely as possible; events in these databases are 
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always ‘geocoded’ or assigned geographic coordinates which allows them to be mapped using a 
geographic information system (GIS). 
An advantage of such geocoded data is that they are delinked from any underlying 
administrative area. In the parlance of spatial analysis and GIS, they are encoded as spatial point 
data rather than assigned as attributes to two-dimensional geographic areas such as counts of 
events in a country or region. This means that points can potentially be combined with other 
spatial organized datasets in different ways or at varying levels for investigation and analysis. 
For example, the literature often models geocoded event data as a function of different local 
demographic, political, and economic measures, including factors as diverse as the nature of 
government, population composition, ethnic divisions, poverty, income, inequality, or number 
and morale of troops (Hegre et al. 2009, Deny and Walter 2014). Environmental factors such as 
rainfall and temperature variability, visibility and windy conditions, frequency of droughts, and 
endowment of natural resources are also commonly used to predict episodes of organized 
violence around the world (Carter and Veale 2013, Marineau et al. 2018). 
This is the underlying approach of efforts like the Violence Early-Warning System 
(ViEWS) project (Hegre et al. 2019) which assume that an incident of violence is partly a 
function of the characteristics of the setting where it occurs. Although the role of geography as 
an influence on human agency is contested in the literature, the incorporation of location-based 
co-variates in such models recognizes that the resources for political action will always vary 
geographically and that some relevant influences on agency can be observed and measured in the 
settings in which a violent event occurs. There remain issues with this approach to incorporating 
geography into the modeling of political violence, such as assumptions that the relationships 
between context and action are stationary across a geographic region (see Radil 2019). 
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Nonetheless, disaggregated geocoded events are now the standard in the literature as they are 
understood to provide a means to incorporate other location-specific data for modeling purposes.  
While geolocated event data are now common for the reasons described above, the 
geography of a set of events itself is rarely a point of investigation in the literature beyond a 
basic descriptive mapping of event locations. This means that the inherent spatiality of political 
event data is largely underexplored even though it is suitable for the application of the techniques 
of spatial analysis, such as point pattern analysis or PPA. PPA is a set of methods used to detect 
patterns among a set of locations represented as points in two-dimensional geographic space 
(e.g., Fotheringham et al. 2007). For example, should a group of violent events be expected to 
present any form of geographical arrangement, such as clustering or dispersion? Although the 
tools of PPA are well developed, they are rarely applied to events of political violence (see 
O’Loughlin and Witmer 2011 and Zammit-Mangion et al. 2013 for important exceptions). 
Such investigations of the spatiality of subnational political event data are a necessary 
first step to consider other important questions, such as how political violence spreads 
geographically over time. While the literature has established connections between rough terrain 
(Hendrix 2011), the proximity to porous borders (Walther and Miles 2018), the structure of the 
road network (Zhukov 2012), and distance from centers of political power and the potential for 
violence, the overall process of the diffusion of violence remains complex and understudied. For 
example, Schutte and Weidman (2011) clarified that violence can spread through multiple and 
different processes, including through both the escalation and relocation of a conflict between 
belligerents.  However, their study was limited to a case of conflict within a single state, which 
limits the insight that can be applied to conflicts involving groups that span international borders. 
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In sum, direct investigations of the spatiality of disaggregated and geocoded political 
conflict event data has lagged behind other applications, such as using event locations to link to 
other spatial datasets for modeling purposes. Further, while many of subnational factors that 
purport to explain why violence occurs have been investigated, the processes involved in the 
spatial diffusion of political violence remain underexplored. These are some of the animating 
issues behind our efforts and the Spatial Conflict Dynamics indicator (SCDi) is intended to be a 
first step to help fill this gap. 
The SCDi is designed to use disaggregated event data within a time-consistent 
framework. Because it can be applied to any underlying configuration or regions, including 
existing administrative units or a systematic overlay, like a uniform grid, it can also complement 
existing efforts to produce information on political, economic, and environmental variables. 
However, it is important to note that the SCDi is primarily an indicator to explore the spatiality 
and dynamic evolution of subnational conflict rather than a means of defining a method for 
regression modeling using disaggregated data (e.g., Tollefsen et al. 2012). 
 
The Spatial Conflict Dynamics indicator of political violence 
The SCDi reflects the central themes about the spatial properties of a point pattern. It is 
comprised of two complementary metrics that focus on two spatial properties of violence: the 
relative intensity of conflict within a region or zone (conflict intensity) and the distribution of 
conflict locations relative to each other (conflict concentration). In the language of PPA, 
intensity is a ‘first-order’ property of a point pattern that provides a local insight into the 
distribution of events across a study region. It shows where do the patterns differ. Concentration 
is a ‘second-order’ property that provides a global insight into how events are expressed. It 
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shows whether the pattern is generally clustered, regular, or dispersed. The methods used for 
both metrics are described below followed by a discussion of how they are combined by the 
SCDi.   
 
Measuring conflict intensity 
A first-order property of a point pattern refers to the intensity of the underlying process 
that produces events across a study area that can be represented as points at discrete locations 
(Diggle 2003). Measurements of this property are concerned with the variation in the expression 
of points across a defined or bounded study region. The intensity of conflict events can be 
estimated from a point pattern’s observed spatial density, which is simply derived from dividing 
the sum of the number of events in a region by a measurement of the study region’s area (such as 
square kilometers) for a defined time period. This can be applied to the entire study region, 
yielding a single estimate of the ‘global’ spatial density. 
Spatial density can also be ‘localized’ by first subdividing the study region into smaller 
and ideally identically-sized subregions, and then calculating the density for each subregion. 
Figure 1 illustrates how the local spatial density of violence can vary according to the number of 
violent events within a hypothetical study region that is divided into six subregions of 10 square 
km each. This approach is the basis for many area-based methods to investigate point patterns, 
such as quadrat analysis, a technique that examines whether events are distributed randomly or 
according to a pre-arranged pattern (e.g., Diggle 2003).  
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Figure 1. Spatial density can vary across a study region and be estimated locally by dividing the 
area into smaller subregions. 
 
Source: authors 
  
When applied to such smaller subregions, spatial density measures can help identify 
localized differences in the intensity of conflict across a larger region. These measures can also 
be used to identify local changes to the intensity of violence over time. From this perspective, 
spatial density is useful in clarifying trends in violence both over space and time and may be 
helpful in recognizing the potential implications of an intensification of violence over time in 
certain subregions. For example, if an increase in the number of violent events takes place 
adjacent to an international boundary, this may indicate a conflict process is at risk of becoming 
regionalized or preparing to spread to new regions.  
It is important to note that while spatial density is calculated using point data, it is not a 
measurement of the absolute location of points relative to each other. Instead, it is a 
measurement of a relative variability of events based on subregional divisions. The size and 
configuration of these divisions is always the prerogative of the researcher and the imposition of 
a uniform grid is common. Nonetheless, other choices are possible, including the use of unevenly 
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sized- and shaped-areas, like political administrative units as the number of events is 
standardized by the amount of area within the subregion.  
This spatial density measurement, which we refer to from here forward as conflict 
intensity or CI, has a lower bound of 0 when there are no events within a subregion during a 
given time interval. Because there is no conceptual limit to the number of conflict events that can 
occur, the CI measure also has no upper bound. Accordingly, as the CI measure increases from 0, 
it reflects a higher intensity of events within a subregion during a given time interval. 
In our study, we use CI scores as one half of the SCDi but they can also be used 
separately. For example, it is possible to classify a subregion as exhibiting a local CI score that is 
either higher or lower than expected when compared to some expected CI measurement. To do 
this, a cutoff value must be established to create a threshold for classification purposes. While 
this can be done in a number of ways, we illustrate it in our study by first dividing the study 
region using a uniform grid, then calculating the CI score for every grid cell for every year in the 
study. We use this set of CI measures to calculate the mean CI score (excluding zeros) over that 
time span. This resulted in what we called the CI ‘generational mean’ or the average conflict 
intensity for a subregion. Therefore, a subregion has a high density if it is greater than the 
generational mean and a low density otherwise. 
 
Measuring the concentration of violence 
A second-order property of a point pattern refers to the relative concentration of points to 
each other across a study area and is concerned with whether points are clustered together or 
dispersed from each other (Diggle 2003). A variety of measures have been proposed to estimate 
this property, including those that capture a point pattern’s observed average distance between 
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each point and its nearest point. Unlike a localized measure of spatial density then, spatial 
concentration is a ‘global’ measure of the propensity for patterning of points relative to each 
other across an entire study region. In this way, distance-based concentration measures can help 
identify tendencies in how points are expressed or realized across a larger region. 
Most measures of point concentration take departures from a randomly generated pattern 
(either toward clustering or dispersion) as an open question and the development of statistical 
methods to evaluate the concentration of point patterns has been a major focus in spatial analysis. 
However, for most human-caused phenomena that are represented as points, randomness is the 
exception rather than the rule (e.g., Gatrell et al. 1996). Therefore, we have not emphasized the 
statistical potential for point randomness in the development of the indicator. Rather, we are 
concerned with characterizing the amount of either clustering or dispersion in the pattering of 
conflict events for a given time period.  
Among distance-based point‐pattern measures, a widely used technique is the average 
distance to the nearest neighbor (ESRI 2020). With this method, the average distance to a 
neighboring point is compared against the expected distance under an assumption of a spatially 
random pattern. If the ratio of the observed average nearest-neighbor distance and the expected 
distance is less than 1 the pattern is clustered, and if it is greater than 1 the pattern is dispersed. 
The ratio has a lower bound of 0 with no conceptual upper bound which would represent an 
extreme geographic clustering of events together in a region (all events at the exact same 
location). A ratio score of 1 would represent a random pattern of event locations as some would 
be near each other with others far away but there would be no overall detectible locational 
pattern. A ratio score more than 1 would represent the relative dispersion of events across the 
region as they will be further apart from each other than expected. 
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This is illustrated in the example below in Figure 2. Ten randomly placed events in an 
area would result in an average nearest neighbor distance of 12 km. Observed-to-expected ratios 
smaller than one would indicate clustered events while ratios greater than one indicate dispersed 
events. The distribution of events on the left-hand side of Figure 2, for example, is clustered 
compared with a random distribution of the same number of events, as shown by its ratio of 0.5. 
The distribution on the right-hand side is more dispersed, with a ratio of 1.5. 
 
Figure 2. Spatial concentration distinguishes between clustered, random, and dispersed events as 
measured by the ANN ratio. 
 
Source: authors 
 
The SCD indicator uses this average nearest neighbor ratio to determine if violent events 
are clustered or dispersed. While this can be done across an entire study region, it can also be 
applied using the same division of a study region into subregions as discussed in the previous 
section. To do this, we first measure the distance between each violent incident in a subregion to 
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its nearest neighbor’s location, then average all these nearest neighbor distances. The average 
nearest neighbor ratio is then used to determine whether the patterns of violent events exhibit 
clustering or dispersion.  
This measurement of conflict concentration (or CC here after) comprises the other half of 
the SCDi. Similar to conflict intensity, CC can also be used as a stand-alone metric to classify a 
subregion as exhibiting clustering or dispersion. However, unlike CI, the threshold value to use 
for classification purposes is already provided by the method. CC scores lower than 1 can be 
classified as clustered and scores higher than 1 classified as dispersed. 
 
Four conflict geographies 
By applying the two metrics of conflict intensity and conflict concentration to the same 
subregion, the SCDi allows the classification of such areas along both a high/low intensity 
continuum and a clustered/dispersed continuum. This then allows the identification of four 
different spatial typologies of conflict according to whether violence is more or less intense and 
dispersed or clustered (Table 1). The first type applies to subregions where there is an above 
average intensity and a clustered distribution of violent events, suggesting that violence is intense 
but localized within the subregion. The second type is when a conflict is characterized by a 
higher than average intensity and a dispersed distribution, indicating that the violence is 
impacting more locations than with the previous type. The third type applies to subregions where 
there are fewer violent activities and most of them occur near each other. The fourth type is then 
when a lower than average intensity and a dispersed distribution of events are combined. 
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Table 1. Spatial typologies of conflict according to intensity and concentration of events. 
  High intensity Low intensity 
Clustered 
Type 1 
More events than mean and 
closer together than expected 
Type 2 
Fewer events than mean and 
closer together than expected 
Dispersed 
Type 3 
More events than mean and 
further apart than expected 
Type 4 
Fewer events than mean and 
further apart than expected 
Source: authors. 
 
These spatial typologies are interesting on their own and suggestive of conflict as a 
political process that occurs in both space and time. For example, when the first type (which 
combines high intensity and clustering) persists over time, it may indicate that the belligerents 
are relatively balanced in terms of capabilities with no group able to claim outright control in the 
subregion. The last type combining low intensity and dispersion may be expected to occur when 
a conflict is occurring between parties with clear capability imbalances (e.g., hit-and-run style 
attacks). Such conditions may also be found during the early and late stages of an insurgency and 
rebellion. In short, these spatial typologies may be connected to certain other issues, such as the 
capabilities of groups, and to the relative timing of a conflict’s ‘life-cycle’. 
 
An application to North and West Africa 
To illustrate the SCDi and the questions it raises, we applied the indicator to a large 
multi-state region across North and West Africa where, since the early 2000s, a mix of ethnic 
rebel groups, transnational extremist organizations, and self-defense militias have challenged the 
legitimacy of several states (OECD 2020). Specifically it was applied to 5 North African 
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countries (Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia and the Western Sahara) and 17 West African 
countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo).  
While not all countries in the region have experienced significant episodes of armed 
conflict, many of the region’s governments are increasingly confronted with non-state actors that 
tend to relocate to other countries when confronted by counter-insurgency efforts (Skillicorn et 
al. 2019). In northern Nigeria, for example, the joint counter-offensive led by Nigeria and its 
regional allies has led the Jihadist organization Boko Haram to develop its activities in 
neighboring Niger and Cameroon since the mid-2010s (Thurston 2018). Al Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM) has followed a similar evolution: expelled from northern Algeria by 
government forces, the Jihadist organization has first relocated to Mali in the mid-2000s, before 
moving to neighboring Burkina Faso and Niger in recent years (OECD 2020). The geographic 
spread and opportunistic relocation of such conflicts is amplified by the lack of controls on many 
African borders that facilitate the circulation of fighters, hostages and weapons (Walther and 
Miles 2018). In this section, we describe how the SCDi can contribute to understand changes in 
the evolution of conflict in the region over the last 20 years. 
 
Data source 
As discussed earlier, the SCD indicator can leverage spatial data from most disaggregated 
datasets. In this paper, we used event data from the ACLED project, which provides detailed and 
georeferenced information on actors in armed conflict without imposing a threshold on the 
number of fatalities recorded for each event (Raleigh et al. 2010). It was applied to the countries 
listed above from January 1997 to June 2019. We used also calendar years as the temporal 
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interval in our example, which resulting in assessing violence each full year between 1997 and 
2018 (22 years). 
For our example, we focused on the three main categories of events classified as violent 
by ACLED: battles, explosions and remote violence, and violence against civilians (Table 2). 
During the period of observation, these 30,360 events have involved 2551 unique organizations 
and caused 138,207 fatalities. Demonstrations and non-violent events such as agreements, 
arrests, disrupted weapons use, headquarters established, looting and non-violent transfer of 
territory were excluded from the analysis. Apart from excluding the types of events described 
above, we used ACLED’s classifications without modification. Readers are referred to the 
ACLED codebook (ACLED 2019b) for more detailed information. 
 
Table 2. ACLED violent event types, event counts, and associated fatalities, Jan 1997-Jun 2019. 
Event type Sub-event type Events Fatalities 
Battles Armed clash 12,206 59,733 
 Government regains 
territory 
898 4748 
 Non-state actor 
overtakes territory 
827 4277 
Explosions/Remote 
violence 
Chemical weapon 0 0 
 Air/drone strike 1487 5564 
 Suicide bomb 483 4882 
 Shelling/artillery/missile 
attack 
725 1176 
 Remote 
explosive/landmine/IED 
2137 7605 
 Grenade 53 48 
Violence against 
civilians 
Sexual violence 119 887 
 Attack 9948 49,287 
 Abduction/forced 
disappearance 
1477 0 
Total   30,360 138,207 
Source: authors based on ACLED data. 
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Choosing the right grid for the region 
As previously described, the SCDi can be applied to any group of regions or areas. We 
adopted the conventional approach in the literature and divided the larger study region into a 
uniform grid of 6540 subregions (or cells from here forward) of 50 by 50 km. Each cell therefore 
encompassed the same amount of land area (2,500 square km). In any such endeavor, it is 
important to explore alternative approaches to defining subregions, which will always 
necessarily reflect the details of the larger study region (see Figure 3 below). For example, using 
a much smaller grid of 10 by 10 km across such a vast region would have potentially provided a 
more granular understanding of violence. However, because political violence is already highly 
clustered at this scale, more than 90% of the cells this size would have been empty. Of the small 
proportion of cells that would have had events within them, fewer than half would have had 
more than one event. The indicator would not have been particularly meaningful with such small 
numbers of points in each cell. Larger cells, such as a 100 by 100 km grid, are another option but 
would have aggregated distant events that would not be necessarily linked to one another. 
By comparison, a 50 by 50 km grid provided a balanced approach to these issues for our 
study region. Each cell in the grid was large enough to aggregate a sufficient number of violent 
events for meaningful analysis while still small enough to provide a localized assessment of 
political violence across the region. This allows comparing the evolution of conflicts from Dakar 
to N’Djamena, and from Lomé to Algiers. Using a uniform grid also provided a much more 
homogeneous representation of violence than existing administrative units, whose size differs 
enormously across countries and bioclimatic zones. Administrative regions tend to be much 
bigger in the sparsely populated Sahara than anywhere else, for example, which would greatly 
affect the density and diffusion of violent events. 
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Figure 3. Examples of alternative grids and the associated number of events by cells. 
 
Source: authors based on ACLED data. 
 
The grid was first overlaid onto the study region and the event locations using a GIS. The 
cells were then used to determine the two separate calculations needed for the indicator: conflict 
intensity and conflict concentration per cell. Next, we calculated the CI generational mean to use 
for classification purposes, which was 0.0017 events per square kilometer between 1997 and 
2016. Given that the study uses a region of 2,500 square km, a low-density region is then one 
with four or fewer events in a calendar year. Therefore, when the CI of a subregion was less than 
0.0017, it was classified as low-intensity, when it was above that value it was classified as high-
intensity.  
Calculations were then completed using a Python script developed by the research team. 
This primarily consisted of two nested loops that first calculated the conflict intensity and then 
the conflict concentration for each cell, year, and type of event. Because the clustering 
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calculation requires a minimum input of two points, the script also selected only the cells that 
contained more than one violent event within them. The resulting output for any given year was 
a grid of subregions with the spatial density and clustering measures for each cell containing two 
or more events. Pre-processing of the ACLED data was done in R. In the following discussion, 
we first consider conflict intensity and conflict concentration separately before discussing the full 
SCDi results. 
 
Conflict intensity: more subregions are experiencing violence, but intensity has been consistent 
Applying the CI metric to every grid by year shows how the geography of conflict has 
changed over time in the region and we highlight a few takeaways from examining the CI by 
itself at the beginning and end of the time range of our study. First, in 1997, most of the cells 
classified as more intensely violent were within Sierra Leone, with additional small pockets 
found along the Algerian and Nigerian coasts. However, in 2018, the geography of violence was 
quite different. Over time, violence had shifted away from most of the aforementioned locations 
and was found in new places within Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Libya 
(Figure 4). This shows the overall geographical dynamism inherent in political violence and why 
it is important for indicators or measures such as ours to include a temporal as well as a spatial 
view. 
Second, not only has the location of violence shifted over time since 1997, but it has also 
expanded in scope within the region. In 1997, 85 subregions had two or more events but in 2018 
that number had increased to 433. In the context of this example, that represents slightly more 
than a 500% increase in the total number of subregions with violence. Interestingly, this increase 
is consistent when considering subregions of both high- and low-intensity. The proportion of 
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high- and low-intensity violence subregions is nearly the same between the years (59% high-
intensity in 1997, 55% in 2018). 
 
Figure 4. Conflict intensity categories in North and West Africa, 1997 and 2018. 
 
Source: authors based on ACLED data. 
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Third, while the proportion of low- and high-intensity subregions is relatively unchanged, 
it is clear that there is a propensity for CI-clustering to occur. Many of the high-intensity 
subregions form contiguous blocks adjacent to other high-intensity blocks. These groupings tend 
to be surrounded by similar groupings of low-intensity subregions. In short, the CI shows an 
inherent spatial tendency in political violence for an intensity gradient to emerge during conflict. 
 
Conflict concentration: violence patterns have become more dispersed 
Considering conflict concentration by itself also highlights interesting patterns. First, 
conflict is largely localized within subregions and events are highly likely to occur near one 
another: the average percentage of subregions classified as clustered (CC < 1) is nearly 91% over 
the years considered. As a side effect of this geography, the sundry negative impacts of violence 
are more likely to be felt in the same subregions and populated places repeatedly. In recent years, 
however, the percentage of subregions that exhibited clustering of violence has dropped from 
95% in 2011 to 82% in 2018. This may indicate that violence is become more slightly dispersed. 
This is a likely consequence of shifting tactics, including the marked increase in the numbers of 
attacks against civilians as these types of events may be less likely to occur in similar locations 
over time. 
Second, subregions with dispersed violence locations are a particular cause for concern 
because they may be evidence of the spread of conflict to a new area from a neighboring region. 
Conversely, a dispersed pattern may be evidence that a conflict is weakening or that one party is 
dominant in a region, as fewer violent events occur in nearby locations. In other words, a 
dispersed pattern can identify regions where a transition is underway in either direction. 
Alarmingly, the percentage of subregions in 2018 with dispersed events (CC > 1) is nearly 17%, 
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the highest percentage of the all the years in the study. This is 7% higher than the historical 
baseline between 1997 and 2016 and may be a sign of the incorporation of new places into the 
already intensely localized geography of conflicts. If correct, this would result in a negative 
feedback cycle by exposing more locations with the region to the effects of violence. 
Third, the relative locations of clustered and dispersed pattern regions have also shifted 
over time. For example, all of the major conflict areas (Figure 5) across the study region include 
clustered regions in 2018. Over time, dispersed patterns have mostly been associated with 
conflict zones in Nigeria. The most populous country in Africa, Nigeria is also the country that 
has, by far, the largest number of violent events (9,017) and fatalities (67,512). Nigeria is home 
to three major sources of continuous violence that explain the unusual intensity and geographical 
extent of conflicts in the country: the Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast, communal 
violence in the Middle Belt, and the Niger Delta insurgency in the south. Taken together, these 
conflicts account for 30% of the violent events and half of the victims recorded in North and 
West Africa since 1997. 
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Figure 5. Conflict concentration categories in North and West Africa, 1997 and 2018. 
 
Source: authors based on ACLED data. 
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The dynamic geography of political violence  
Since the SCDi combines both measures to identify the four spatial typologies discussed 
previously, these combined classifications can be used to consider how the geography of conflict 
has evolved in the region over time. In particular, the SDCi results show that that the last 10 
years have been marked by an increase in all types of conflicts in North and West Africa. 
The number of subregions experiencing a high-intensity and clustering (type 1) has 
increased significantly faster over time than the other spatial types. Historically, this type of 
conflict has been widespread in the region but its proportion to the other types has continuously 
increased since the mid-2000s, from 38% in 2008 to more than half ten years later (Figure 5). 
Nowadays, these subregions often form the core of large epicenters of violence, as in central 
Mali, northern Burkina Faso, around Lake Chad, in the Middle Belt and the Niger Delta in 
Nigeria, and in Libya (Figure 6). 
Subregions in which conflicts are characterized by a high-intensity of dispersed events 
(type 2), are fortunately quite rare in the region. They concern only 3% of the cells, a proportion 
that has not changed much over the last 20 years. Several time periods with no cells of dispersed-
high density are recorded, indicating that this combination is a rather unusual occurrence in the 
region. However, the locations where this type has been observed are also where conflict has 
been the most entrenched in the last decade, including the Inner Niger Delta in Mali, southern 
Nigeria, the Liptako-Gourma between Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, and the border region 
between Nigeria and Cameroon. 
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Figure 6. Time series of conflict subregions by SCDi categories, 1997-2018. 
 
Source: authors based on ACLED data. 
 
The number of subregions in which political violence is both clustered and of low-
intensity (type 3) has experienced strong growth since 2010. This type concerns a third (31%) of 
the cells of the wider region. However, these conflict subregions are still less well-represented 
than during mid-2000s, when they accounted for half of the four categories. They are often found 
on the periphery of more intense conflict zones, such as on the outskirts of major cities in Libya. 
Subregions that experience dispersed and low-intensity events (type 4) are also rare. This 
type is found in only 13% of the cells overall but the percentage of those subregions has doubled 
over the last 10 years. These subregions are located at the periphery of the major war zones or in 
some countries with fewer violent events, such as Ghana, Guinea or Algeria.  
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Figure 7. Spatial Conflict Dynamics indicator categories in North and West Africa, 2018. 
 
Source: ACLED. Calculations and cartography by the authors. 
 
The changing composition of spatial typologies over time is suggestive of other aspects 
of conflict geography that remain understudied in the literature. For example, how often does a 
subregion experience a sudden outbreak of intense and clustered violence? Do conflicts tend to 
begin with one type and transition to others? And what is the propensity for types to change to 
something else over time? The SCDi allows the exploration of the dynamics associated with the 
typologies and such changes are clearly observable when we visualize the year-to-year interplay 
between the various spatial typologies identified by the indicator. For example, a subregion 
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might have a SCDi classification as clustered/high-intensity in 2003, a score of clustered/low 
intensity in 2004, and no conflict in 2005.  
In Figure 8 below, we tallied these annual shifts across the entire 22 years of the study 
into an alluvial chart to show how often changes from one type to another occur. Subregions 
with no or just one conflict event in a given year are excluded in the figure; the remaining 
subregions are then used to highlight how conflict geography has evolved over time. There are 
several takeaways from this type of presentation. 
 
Figure 8. Yearly shifts in Spatial Conflict Dynamics indicator categories, 1997 to 2018. 
 
 
Source: authors based on ACLED data. Note: the figure shows how many regions have 
experienced a change in conflict from one year to another between 1997 and 2019. Each region 
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is classified according to its initial and final intensity and concentration of violent events. The 
figure excludes regions that never receive an SCDi score over any year in the study. 
 
First, the SCDi shows that subregions where violence is both clustered and intense (type 
1) are likely to remain unchanged year-to-year. The most common outcome is for a 
clustered/high-intensity region in one year to remain unchanged in the following year, an 
outcome which occurs 70% of the time. This reflects the potential for a localized conflict to 
continue over multiple years, a common occurrence in the various conflict zones in Nigeria for 
instance. 
However, the second most common outcome for a clustered/high-intensity region is to 
have no conflict the following year (19%), meaning that even intense localized conflicts can 
come to a rather abrupt end. The third most common outcome for this type is a shift is to 
clustered/low-intensity (8%), which may be interpreted as a transition state along the way to 
conflict de-escalation. For example, many of the major cities in Libya (Tripoli, Benghazi, 
Misratah, Al Khums) continue to have higher than average numbers of events year-to-year. 
Between 2017 and 2018, the event locations within those conflict zones remained clustered 
together within the city’s extent rather than occurring at dispersed locations around the 
countryside. 
Second, subregions where violence is clustered but of low intensity (type 3) are likely to 
change for the better. The most common changes for clustered/low-intensity subregions are 
either to have no conflict (70% of the time) or to become clustered/high-intensity (12%) the 
following year. This reinforces the idea that clustered/low-intensity subregions may represent a 
state of transition and are therefore unlikely to persist year-to-year, which only happens 6% of 
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the time. For example, several conflict regions in Yobe and Gombe states in northeast Nigeria 
changed from low intensity but clustered conflict locations in 2017 to no conflict the following 
year. 
Third, subregions where violence is dispersed and intense (type 2) are also likely to 
improve. These are the rarest occurring outcomes in the study, a positive sign as they may 
represent both an intensifying and spreading conflict. Hopefully, the most common outcome is 
for such subregions to have no conflict the following year (71%) which points to their inherent 
instability. The other most frequent outcomes are to either remain unchanged or to shift to 
clustered/high-intensity (each outcome happens 14% of the time). For example, conflict around 
Biu in Nigeria’s Borno state changed from dispersed but high intensity to no conflict between 
2017 and 2018. Similar examples over that same time period were found in rural areas of 
Nigeria’s Benue and Edo states and in Chad around Moundou in Logone Occidental. 
Fourth, subregions where violence is both dispersed and of low intensity (type 4) are 
likely to have no conflict the following year. As with the clustered/low-intensity and 
dispersed/high-intensity categories, the most common outcome for dispersed/low-intensity 
subregions is to experience no conflict the following year (73%). 14% of the time, these 
subregions became clustered/high-intensity; 10% of the time, they remain unchanged. For 
example, between 2017 and 2018, numerous examples of conflict zones changing from dispersed 
and low intensity conflict to no conflict were found in Nigeria (Bayelsa, Benue, Borno, Edo, and 
Imo states), in Mali (Timbuktu region), and Libya (near Benghazi). 
Lastly, subregions that are not affected by conflicts are likely to remain peaceful but, 
when a change happens, it is likely to be a localized low intensity conflict (type 3). Most 
subregions never experienced conflict over the study’s time range. However, subregions that did 
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shift from no conflict to one of the other SCDi categories are troubling as this resents a sudden 
introduction (or perhaps re-introduction) of conflict into a previously peaceful region. When 
conflict does emerge in a region where it was previously absent, it is most often as clustered/low-
intensity (51%). However, it also commonly jumps directly to clustered/high-intensity (42%). 
This may reflect the worst possible outcome given the persistence of that category over time. For 
example, several areas in the central part of Mali’s Mopti region that had no conflict events in 
either 2016 or 2017 were classified as clustered and high intensity in 2018. When conflict 
emerged, it erupted into the category that has the most persistence over time. 
 
Conclusion 
The Spatial Conflict Dynamics indicator (SCDi) introduced in this article makes it 
possible to take into account the great diversity of current conflicts in the world. By combining 
two important measures of the geography of conflict (intensity and concentration), the indicator 
shows promise to clarify no just where conflict occurs but the different forms it can take when it 
happens. In North and West Africa, where the indicator was applied for the first time, it also 
revealed several important elements about long-term political violence in the region that can 
inform analysts, policy officials and other stakeholders interested in the advancement of peace. 
Below we discuss what we believe to be some of the important broader implications of our 
efforts. 
First, using the SCDi to track the long-term evolution of the geography of violence 
highlights that the location of violence is highly dynamic over time. Most of the major conflict 
areas of the 1990s are peaceful today and much of the current violence is observed in states that 
were considered stable 15 years ago. This shifting and relocating of political instability, 
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including across international boundaries, should encourage more research on how this diffusion 
process works even as disaggregated data collection efforts continue to track the locations of 
violence at fine-grained scales. It also highlights how a regional approach can be helpful; a focus 
on an individual country or even on a smaller set of states would have missed this essential 
character of political violence and perhaps failed to detect the direction and implications of such 
shifts when they occur. For those reasons, the SCDi can be used as a tool to monitor the larger 
patterns of violence regionally, keeping a watchful eye on the conditions that may be involved 
with the transitions from peace to violence and vice-versa. 
Second, the SCDi illustrates how violence operates geographically over time. The 
recognition that violence can be differently concentrated while also varying by intensity provides 
a more nuanced understanding that can shape both governance strategies to deal with the 
circumstance and affect the relative efficacy of those efforts. For example, a highly clustered 
expression of violence will result in a different form of impacts on people and places than will a 
highly diffuse expression. Accordingly, relief and violence suppression efforts will necessarily 
need to take on a different character to address each. Similarly, understanding the relative 
intensity of violence over time in the same place or area is an important metric of human security 
that stakeholders can use to assess the effectives of their response to violence. That the SCDi 
addresses both aspects of the geography of violence speaks to the potential utility of it as a 
response tool when there is an outbreak of violence. 
Third, the SCDi showed how the spatial dynamics of conflict have played out in 
aggregate over time. By tracking the SCDi categories in the same subregions over time, we are 
able to assemble a first glimpse at how conflict has evolved over time within the region. Of 
course, we recognize that an application of this approach to a different region and/or across a 
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different time period may have yielded different results about the relationships between 
categories and more work is needed to establish how contingent or contextual these findings may 
be. Helpfully, the SCDi is flexible and adaptable to other geographical and historical contexts, 
including the configuration of the subregions used for the analysis. So long as the trends toward 
the development of disaggregated conflict data continue, the SCDi offers an opportunity to build 
data-driven profiles about the evolution of conflict within different regions and different 
historical eras. 
The SCDi is not intended as a substitute for grounded qualitative knowledge about 
conflict in specific places and we recognize that no measure or indicator will be able to perfectly 
capture all the complexities of the geography of armed conflict. However, we see opportunities 
to significantly improve upon the initial version of the SCDi. For example, the threshold value 
we used for the low/high intensity categories was based on data from all subregions across 20 
years. This could be refined by utilizing a ‘moving window’ method, both in space and time, to 
establish subregion- and year-specific thresholds. This in turn could provide a more nuanced and 
contextual interpretation of what counts as high- and low-intensity conflict based on the details 
or both where and when conflict is occurring. The intensity calculation could also be refined 
through weighting methods to capture variability in the spatial distribution of population or any 
other factor that may be associated with the production of political violence.  
Future efforts to improve and refine the indicator will work to address these concerns. 
Other planned initiatives will focus on developing an open-source version to allow researchers to 
easily apply the indicator to other cases and to encourage other innovations not identified here. 
Ten years after the ACLED database was introduced to the scientific and policy communities, 
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we view the SCDi as an additional tool that can capitalize on the increasing availability of 
geolocated data to provide a more spatial understanding of conflict around the world.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
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